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Haydegger and Sartr: I, the Other and People in the context of the problem of education

The relevance of existentialism representatives’ heritage, namely Heidegger and Sartre, becomes evident while analyzing ontological education grounds [3]. When revealing its importance for psychologists, attention is drawn to the intersection of their ideas with the ideas of psychologists [2]. Also, the main points of Sartre’s philosophy are used in the analysis of social education and a sense of dignity formation [1; 5]. However, the relationship between the Self, the Others, and People in Heidegger and Sartre’s philosophies remain out of attention. Meanwhile, studying them will help clarify the relationship between the content of an educational process and its results.

The solution to the problems of upbringing in the context of existentialism depends largely on an understanding of relations concerning the essence (essentia) and existence (existentia). We should mention that if the essence in metaphysics means opportunity, the existence means reality. Becoming a person is a realization of inherent opportunities. The concept of “existence” is interpreted in Heidegger’s existentialism differently than
existentia in metaphysics. Existence involves the appearance of the truth of being. It should be explained how this happens. Existence is argued to determine a person’s attitude to the history of truth. The answer to the question of the person’s essence lies in the fact whether he/she is able to follow the truth. No wonder he states that “the personal passes and at the same time obscure the essence of the being-historical existence no less than the subject matter” [7, p. 325]. In this context, existence is not the realization of the possibilities inherent in a human, but Dasein, rooted in being. Therefore, existence cannot be regarded as an actualization of the essence (essentia) or as an essential prediction (essentielle). Their relationship can only be regarded as an ecstatic attitude to the clearance of being, removing it from oblivion in ecstasy.

From this point of view, Heidegger criticizes Sartre who according to him formulates the main thesis of existentialism in the way of the postulate that “existence” precedes the “essence”, which corresponds to the postulates of traditional metaphysics, notwithstanding the opposite interpretation of the metaphysical point. This is the reason why from Heidegger’s point of view Sartre falls into forgetting the truth. Heidegger is against the division of existence into esseessentia and esseexistentia. He believes that “project” and the “outline” should not be seen as a suggestive representation, but only as an ecstatic attitude to the clearance of being [7, p. 326].

The philosopher sees the task of existentialism not in its purpose for a human, since he/she is capable to be in the truth of being. However, this does not reject the forgetting of the truth of being, or “falling away”. Accordingly, being is differed as true and false. According to Heidegger language helps find a true being and is the “home of being”, which corresponds to the essence of man. It is through language that a person can have himself and discover the truth of being.

Sartre brings the Another to the place of language. When considering the shame, the attention is drawn to the fact that it appears towards someone [4, p. 362]. This someone sees me, looks at Me and evaluates Me. Therefore, reflection becomes the reason that I am the way “the other sees me”. It means that seeing the Self as I am for myself is equivalent to how I am towards others. We should mention that he partly preserves the traditions of the classical philosophical paradigm. This is obvious when considering how solipsism is criticized [4, p. 363-377].

The French philosopher insists that the connection with the other is first the relation of being with being, but not cognition with cognition. It
is in this context that Heidegger interprets being-in-the-world as well as being-with. The main disadvantage of interpreting it, according to Sartre, is that others do not relate to me as an ontic reality. Besides, he argues that the relationship with the others cannot be confrontation itself. Therefore, he believes that being-with is also being with someone. But this is not a helper similar to Heidegger’s ideas, which has the character of proximity [6, p. 102]. It can be considered by changing distances and calculating usage and utilizing. Such an interpretation of proximity is explained by the fact that this has its place, which implies a use that is relevant to executing the case. It’s just the area, not the other one that owns the being according to Sartre. As far as Heidegger is concerned the area is a sphere where one can show concern, some permanent helper, which in turn is focused on another helper.

According to Sartre focus is replaced by a view that allows seeing another. No wonder he defends the point that the others are not my object, but at the same time belong to my distances [4, p. 409]. We should draw attention to the fact that Heidegger’s “distance” is considered as a relation between places, while Sartre interprets it as my distances. It follows that my existence is determined by the ability to be seen by others. Therefore, the look focused on me determines my existence. This is the originality of reflexive consciousness. He mentions that thanks to it I can be ashamed, and the shame reveals what my being is [4, p. 419].

Unlike Heidegger, who takes into account a human and people, Sartre researches the Self as an independent entity showing itself in a dialectical relationship with the others. It depends on the other who I will be. The so special other is the caregiver who leads to a world where the child finds himself or herself as a person. It is he who initiates the assignment of the meanings of existence by which the personality of the caretaker is formed.

It should be mentioned that Heidegger considers the everyday being of the Self, in which a person seeks to maintain a distance because he is people’s helper [6, p. 126]. It is understood that a person is directed, used, and thus he strengthens the position of others. When considering what people are, he indicates their ambiguity, because when addressing them it is unclear who to keep in mind. It is clear that in this situation a person seeks to become invisible and cannot be recognized as a person. This is what allows people to establish their dictatorship. We should notice that the term “people” refers to a boundless community in which the individual is lost. People are the totality that subjugates. That is why
Let us look at how Heidegger describes the influence of people: “People have their own manners. The mentioned tendency of being, called our distance, is based on the fact that being with others, as such, is worried by the middle. It is an existential trait of people. In fact, for people, it is about being which touches upon it. Therefore, a person stays in the middle of what is considered important, and also in the fact that such is not considered, for what success is recognized, but is denied. This mediocrity, while outlining what can and should be, follows every exception. Any advantage without noise is suppressed. Everything original here is smoothed out as long known. Everything reclaimed becomes manual. Every secret loses its power. The concern of mediocrity exposes the essential tendency of presence, which we call the equation of all existential possibilities” [6, p. 127].

In Sartre’s existentialism, there is somebody other who takes place of people and influences me. The other is the mediator that helps to connect Me with myself [4, p. 362]. It allows you to make judgments about yourself as an object. So, My-self is who He is for Him-self. How is the other different from people? The fact is that he does not force himself to “equalize all possibilities”, but only allows to understand himself, acts as kind of a “mirror” in which the Self considers and accept it. No wonder Sartre thinks about the shame in front of others as the way of the education system to “shame” children. That is why being-for-the-self leads to being-for-another, resulting in integrity. Here, integrity arises not as a result of enforcement on the part of humans, according to Heidegger, but as a need to clarify what the Self represents.

Sartre sees Heidegger’s contribution in using his predecessors’ ideas, so he shows the existence of a human as a relation of humans’ realities. For him, the world is a place where a human’s reality declares itself. That is why presence is being-in-the-world. He sees his mistake in accepting the statement “Daseinistjemeines”, because in this situation the other has a special existence [4, p. 394]. Since the other has a special existence, there is a situation (image) not of a struggle, but of a team, of people, among whom there is the Self. Sartre considers such a presence to be “ruins” as people go towards a common goal, which causes “shared loneliness”.

In this context, the main difference between Heidegger’s being-with and Sartre’s being-for is evident. The other in being-with is absent as a Self. He can be seen among people, but his face cannot be seen. Sartre
emphasizes that the other in being-with cannot be defined as real and concrete. According to Heidegger the place of the other is occupied by people in their everyday life, and people seek them in mediocrity. For people he is a helper who can be used at your own discretion. This is because Dasein manifests itself the following way: “Presence is always "enough through itself" not as a relation to another being, but as a being to be able to be the way it is [6, p. 192]. Since the main purpose is “the ability to exist”, the other has no value. The ability to be is necessary to escape the terrifying horror. This is made possible by taking care of yourself.

To avoid such an accusation, Heidegger argues that “anxiety cannot assume a special attitude to being alone”. Its manifestation is related to the creation of conditions of freedom. Because anxiety is an ontological premise, it cannot be determined in any action. It is manifested only in desire and the will, when interpreting people’s capabilities. But what capabilities? Capabilities to be invisible?

It is possible that in describing the nature of the presence Heidegger shows the imperfection of the society of his time, the period of strengthening of the Nazi regime. The “people” of his time consciously took care of the expansion of living space. If so, this interpretation of “concern” can be seen as an expression of an ironic attitude towards contemporaries. Such bitter revelations in “Being and Time” can be found in various places. Perhaps that is why there was no remorse for holding the position of rector at the request of the Nazi authorities. He believed that his criticism of the German society state of consciousness in the 1930s was quite sufficient. In particular, his interpretation of people “man” indicates his point. Therefore, he makes the following accusation: “The common everyday life becomes blind to the possibilities and is reassured by “reality” itself [6, p. 195]. On the contrary, with the help of another Sartre, it is possible to cognate the Self. The other is represented as an educator, who allows the child to see himself, to clarify his existence, to find purpose and freedom.

In interpreting the other, Sartre was largely influenced by Husserl. However, we should notice that the concept of “intent” is replaced by the concept of “look”. This substitution is explained by the fact that intentionality is the orientation of consciousness, the person directs his gaze. Therefore, another is “a person who goes outside, sings at my window, is an object for me” [4, p. 405]. Not like Husserl’s object, but an object that in turn “extends its own distances”. However, since a person manifests himself in the world, he ceases to be an object. This is due to his
ability to be seen by others. Therefore, it is very important how another person, such as an educator, sees me as a person.

Sartre denies treating the other as merely an object and insists that the objectivity of man cannot flow from the objectivity of the world. This is because the other is not an object, but a subject that opens to the world. It is the subject who can grasp the look that is directed at him, he can see another one. The look makes it clear that someone exists. At the same time, Sartre does not deny the possibility of non-reflective consciousness, for example, when contemplating oneself and things. Consciousness becomes reflexive when the other looks at me.

The other manifests itself in the look that opens the present, resulting in the comprehension of me as visible. The look is not only a means of isolating me from the world, but it also enters into me and comprehends me as myself, as a result, I the Self becomes someone. Therefore, in education it is very important what the look is: friendly, calm, respectful, or vice versa – unloved, provoking, abusive. Education itself is being under the look, which is conscious and deliberate. Of course, there is a need to escape from the look, to hide, to conceal and not to be recognized, to be in the middle and not to be responsible for anything. Sartre also says about wanting to hide in a dark corner, but mentions that this opportunity is extremely limited. This need is due to the fact that another can identify and recognize me. But sooner or later they catch me, because the other one illuminates this angle.

Looks have different educational effects. The one may both fascinate and scare, he says. Charm leads to submission; when the one intimidates there is a fear and a desire to hide, to be closed. These are situations where opportunity becomes probable, especially when language is used to clarify the originality of the look. As a clarification of such influence, the philosopher gives a situation which A. Gide calls “the participation of the devil”, which refers to such works of Kafka as “The Process” and “The Castle” [4, p. 423].

Is such a situation possible in pedagogical practice? Certainly. Its presence shows pedagogical failures. The question is how a child sees himself under this look? How he clarifies the likelihood of being someone? He will no longer feel ashamed, will not be afraid to express himself. No wonder Sartre says that under the look of another one, the situation can slip away from me, and “I will not become the master of the situation”. In this interpretation of the look, he is close to Heidegger’s statement, who considers the influence of people. However, the look of another may be
favorable, attentive, supportive. This view is a prerequisite for becoming oneself, finding the ability to act.

Heidegger focuses a great deal on the characterization of the impact of the site. He contemplates about the space of presence. The centre of attention seen as being-in-the-world [6, p. 110]. At the same time, if according to Sartre’s opinion the Self exists on the other side, then in his opinion from the side of the very Self. This definition is only an ontological device. At the same time, it contains the ontic – indication that every time the Self is the one and not the other. The answer to who is coming from the Self of the “subject”, the “self”. Who is that through the change of location and experience is kept identical and relates itself to this multiplicity” [6, p. 114]. Who is the Self which relates itself to others, to people? Of course, very often this is not possible, so there is a desire to become invisible.

When considering attitudes toward man in Heidegger’s existential ontology, one should pay attention to the various aspects of interpreting presence (Dasein). He raises the question of what it is as follows: “Initially questioned about the meaning of being in the same nature of presence” [6, p. 41]. There is no doubt that the question comes from the one who asks, that is, from the Self. However, his freedom is not in doubt, because it is limited to the same as We: “The existence of this being is always mine” (ibid.). However, the question is: to what extent “the being is my” ? There is no doubt that We are dominant over I. At the same time, the philosopher insists that being is “always mine”. However, he reminds us that it is easy to lose it. It is about presence malpractice, which is related to the problem of dominance of presence mediocrity.

Sartre, in contrast, greatly enhances the status of the other in relation to We. This can be demonstrated by the peculiarity of the interpretation of his look and role: “Through the look of the other I see myself frozen in the middle of the world, in danger, irreversible” [4, p. 427]. Following Heidegger, Sartre also says that the Self is in danger of being absorbed in the middle of the world where We are dominated. However, somebody others look helps overcome absorption, giving the opportunity to make sense of the presence. A look allows one to know oneself because “I do not know who I am or what my place in the world is” (ibid.). The ideal other is the caregiver who reveals the mystery of what my essence is.

How is the judgment of me from the side of the other happens, how can I see myself? To understand how this becomes possible, it is necessary to mention the interpretation of the subject (Gegenstand) by Husserl, as he understands “opposite”, at what the intention is directed. At the same
time, it is absolutely not important what the subject matter is: a thing, an idea, a person, etc. Sartre solves the problem of a human being, so this indifference is eliminated. Existence is explained by the look of another, so it is very important how he sees me.

By his look, the other constitutes my existence. However, the constitution is a little different than what Husserl interprets. Its difference is that it is an influence on existence. It is not only the grasping of the essence, as the founder of phenomenology has noted, but also the clarification for the Self, thereby establishing it. In Sartre existentialism, this is possible through the look of another who comes to me with his transcendence. Accordingly, I also have the opportunity to feel the other as a free subject.

Thus, it is obvious that Heidegger’s existential ontology reveals the conditions of the educational process, first of all, the influence of the environment. Therefore, it can be used in pedagogical and psychological research in considering the peculiarities of its impact on personality formation. At the forefront is the state of dependency and the dangers that arise when doing so. This way, the philosopher warns about the threats that exist in education. In contrast, Sartre focuses his attention on the influence of someone who is more secretive than I am. I am under his look, which helps to find the true being. No wonder, he argues, that the basis of the educational system is the ability to shame children.

References:


Transliteration of References:


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Abstracts


Słowa kluczowe: Heidegger, Sartre, Ja, Inny, Ludzie, relacje, edukacja.

ВОЛКОВ ОЛЕКСАНДР. Гайдеггер і Сартр: Я, Інший та Люди у контексті проблематики виховання. У статті порівнюється трактування відносин Я, Іншого і Людей в екзистенціалізмі Гайдеггера і Сартра. Для Гайдеггера Інший стає підручником, область, яка визначається виконанням справи. Турбота є доонтологічною, тому її неможливо розглянути. Орієнтованість є вираженням відносин між місцями, тому людина повинна зберегти дистанцію. Її необ-хідність пов’язана з тим, що Я знаходиться на посилках у Людей. Безсилля Я пояснюється тим, що неможливо визначити те, що являють собою Люди. В результаті кожна людина прагне бути не-помітною, сховатися. На відміну від Гайдеггера, Сартр досліджує Я як самостійну сутність, яка перебуває в діалектичних відносинах з Іншим. Саме тому від вихователя, як Іншого, залежить, яким буде Я вихованця. Вплив Іншого пояснюється поглядом, який прояснює: хто є хто. Саме тому у вихователя з’являється можливість присоромити дітей. З його допомогою дитина може побачити свою унікальність і неповторність, іншими словами, стати особистістю.

Ключові слова: Гайдеггер, Сартр, Я, Інший. Люди, стосунки, виховання.
VOLKOV OLEKSANDR. Haydegger and Sartr: I, the Other and People in the context of the problem of education. The article compares the interpretation of the relationship between I, the Other and People in the existentialism of Heidegger and Sartre. For Heidegger, the Other is a henchman, an area that is determined by the execution of a case. Care that is pre-ontological and therefore impossible to consider. Orientation is the identification of relationships between places, which is why a person must maintain a distance. Its necessity is explained by the fact that I am on the premises of People. The impotence of the Self is due to the fact that it is impossible to determine what People are. As a result, each person seeks to be invisible, hide in the middle. Unlike Heidegger, Sartre explores the Self as an independent entity, which is in dialectic relations with Another. Therefore, it depends on the teacher as Another how I will be the pupil. The influence of Another is explained by a look that clarifies: who is who. That is why the teacher has the opportunity to shame the children. With it, a child has the opportunity to see his uniqueness and uniqueness, in other words, become a person.

Key words: Heidegger, Sartre, I, Other. People, relationships, education.